While the increasing penetration of information and communication technology into distribution grid brings numerous benefits, it also opens up a new threat landscape, particularly through cyberattacks. To provide a basis for countermeasures against such threats, this paper addresses the investigation of the impact and manifestations of cyberattacks on smart grids by replicating the power grid in a secure, isolated, and controlled laboratory environment as a cyber-physical twin. Currently, detecting intrusions by unauthorized third parties into the central monitoring and control system of grid operators, especially attacks within the grid perimeter, is a major challenge. The development and validation of methods to detect and prevent coordinated and timed attacks on electric power systems depends not only on the availability and quality of data from such attack scenarios, but also on suitable realistic investigation environments. However, to create a comprehensive investigation environment, a realistic representation of the study object is required to thoroughly investigate critical cyberattacks on grid operations and evaluate their impact on the power grid using real data. In this paper, we demonstrate our cyber-physical twin approach using a microgrid in the context of a cyberattack case study.
翻译:虽然信息和通信技术日益渗透到分配网中带来许多好处,但也开辟了新的威胁局面,特别是通过网络攻击。为提供对付这种威胁的对策基础,本文件探讨在安全、孤立和受控制的实验室环境中将电网复制为网络物理双胞胎,以调查智能网格受到网络攻击的影响和表现。目前,发现未经授权的第三方侵入电网操作者中央监测和控制系统,特别是电网周边的攻击,是一项重大挑战。制定和验证发现和防止对电网系统进行协调和及时攻击的方法,不仅取决于这种攻击情景中的数据的可得性和质量,而且取决于适当的现实调查环境。然而,为了创造全面调查环境,需要以现实的方式描述研究对象,以便彻底调查电网操作的关键性网络攻击,并利用真实数据评价其对电网的影响。在本文中,我们通过网络攻击案例研究的微电网展示我们的网络-物理双方法。