We consider the problem of finding a maximum popular matching in a many-to-many matching setting with two-sided preferences and matroid constraints. This problem was proposed by Kamiyama (2020) and solved in the special case where matroids are base orderable. Utilizing a newly shown matroid exchange property, we show that the problem is tractable for arbitrary matroids. We further investigate a different notion of popularity, where the agents vote with respect to lexicographic preferences, and show that both existence and verification problems become NP-hard, even in the $b$-matching case.
翻译:我们考虑了在多种匹配环境中找到与双向偏好和机器人制约最接近的大众匹配的问题,这个问题是由Kamiyama(2020年)提出的,在机器人可按基本顺序排列的特殊情况下得到解决。 利用新显示的机器人交换财产,我们证明这个问题可以针对任意的机器人。 我们还进一步调查了另一种流行概念,即代理人在词汇偏好方面投票,并表明存在和核查问题都变得难以解决,甚至在美元匹配的案件中也是如此。