While phishing attacks have evolved to utilize several obfuscation tactics to evade prevalent detection measures, implementing said measures often requires significant technical competence and logistical overhead from the attacker's perspective. In this work, we identify a family of phishing attacks hosted over Free web-Hosting Domains (FHDs), which can be created and maintained at scale with very little effort while also effectively evading prevalent anti-phishing detection and resisting website takedown. We observed over 8.8k such phishing URLs shared on Twitter and Facebook from February to August 2022 using 24 unique FHDs. Our large-scale analysis of these attacks shows that phishing websites hosted on FHDs remain active on Twitter and Facebook for at least 1.5 times longer than regular phishing URLs. In addition, on average, they have 1.7 times lower coverage from anti-phishing blocklists than regular phishing attacks, with a coverage time also being 3.8 times slower while only having half the number of detections from anti-phishing tools. Moreover, only 23.6% of FHD URLs were removed by the hosting domain a week after their first appearance, with a median removal time of 12.2 hours. We also identified several gaps in the prevalent anti-phishing ecosystem in detecting these threats. Based on our findings, we developed FreePhish, an ML-aided framework that acts as an effective countermeasure to detect and mitigate these URLs automatically and more effectively. By regularly reporting phishing URLs found by FreePhish to FHDs and hosting registrars over a period of two weeks, we note a significant decrease in the time taken to remove these websites. Finally, we also provide FreePhish as a free Chromium web extension that can be utilized to prevent end-users from accessing potential FHD-based phishing attacks.
翻译:虽然钓鱼攻击已经演变为利用几种迷糊战术来逃避流行的检测措施,但执行上述措施往往需要从攻击者的角度获得相当的技术能力和后勤支持。 在这项工作中,我们发现一个在免费网友网友Domain(FHDs)(FHDs)上进行钓鱼攻击的家庭,这些家庭的规模可以很小地创建和维持,同时也有效地躲避流行的反钓鱼探测和抵制网站的收缩。我们观察到2022年2月至8月在Twitter和Facebook上分享的8.8k这种钓鱼的URL,使用24种独特的FHDs。我们对这些攻击的大规模分析表明,在FHDs上开设的网友网站比普通网友网友(FHDs)至少多1.5倍。此外,它们从反钓鱼的封杀名单的覆盖面比普通网友攻击要低1.7倍,而且覆盖的时间是3.8倍,而我们从反钓鱼工具的终端探测次数也只有一半。此外,我们只是用FHD URLs 定期在T和Facebook网站上的网友网友访问至少消除了两小时。