We consider a model of oligopolistic competition in a market with search frictions, in which competing firms with products of unknown quality advertise how much information a consumer's visit will glean. In the unique symmetric equilibrium of this game, the countervailing incentives of attraction and persuasion yield a payoff function for each firm that is linear in the firm's realized effective value. If the expected quality of the products is sufficiently high (or competition is sufficiently fierce), this corresponds to full information--firms provide the first-best level of information. If not, this corresponds to information dispersion--firms randomize over signals.
翻译:我们认为,在一个有搜索摩擦的市场中,寡头垄断竞争的模式是,在这种模式中,拥有质量不明的产品的竞争企业会为消费者访问所收集的信息量做广告。 在这种独特的对称平衡中,吸引和说服的反向激励为每个公司带来一个报酬功能,这种功能在公司的实际实际价值上是线性的。 如果产品的预期质量足够高(或竞争足够激烈),这相当于完全的信息公司提供了第一高的信息水平。 如果不是,这相当于信息分散公司对信号的随机排序。