Performance-enhancing mechanisms such as branch prediction, out-of-order execution, and return stack buffer (RSB) have been widely employed in today's modern processing units. Although successful in increasing the CPU performance, exploiting the design flaws and security bugs in these components have set the background for various types of microarchitectural attacks such as Spectre and Meltdown. While many attacks such as Meltdown and Spectre have been numerously implemented and analyzed on Intel processors, few researches have been carried out to evaluate their impact on ARM processors. Moreover, SpectreRSB vulnerability, the newer variant of spectre attack based on RSB, has been neglected in recent studies. In this work, we first evaluate the SpectreRSB vulnerability by implementing this attack on ARM processors, which, to the best of our knowledge, has not been implemented and analyzed on ARM processors. We further present a security evaluation of ARM processors by implementing different variants of Spectre-family attacks. By analyzing the results obtained from various experiments, we evaluate ARM processors security regarding their diverse microarchitectural designs. We also introduce a high throughput and noise-free covert channel, based on the RSB structure. Based on our experiments, the throughput of the covert channel is 94.19KB/s with negligible error.
翻译:在当今现代处理单位中,广泛采用了分支预测、超秩序执行和回炉缓冲(RSB)等增强性能的机制。虽然成功地提高了CPU的性能,但利用了这些部件的设计缺陷和安全漏洞,为各种微分立攻击,如Spectre和Meltdown提供了背景。尽管许多诸如Meltdown和Spectre等攻击行动已经对Intel处理器进行了多次实施和分析,但几乎没有开展过多少研究来评价其对ARM处理器的影响。此外,在近期的研究中,人们忽略了基于RSB的光谱攻击的新变种,即SpectreRSB的脆弱性。我们首先通过对ARM处理器进行这次攻击来评估SpectreRSB的脆弱性。 据我们所知,对ARM的处理器没有执行和分析。我们还通过实施不同的Spectreectrection-家庭攻击来对ARM处理器进行安全评价。我们通过分析各种实验的结果,我们评估ARM-Arprestrain处理器的安全及其94-CFal-CFal-CFlationFlationFenal Intraction Steal Instrubal strubal strutal des strual des。我们通过高频基的磁基进行了一种高压试验。