Thirty study participants playtested an innocent-looking "escape room" game in virtual reality (VR). Behind the scenes, an adversarial program had accurately inferred over 25 personal data attributes, from anthropometrics like height and wingspan to demographics like age and gender, within just a few minutes of gameplay. As notoriously data-hungry companies become increasingly involved in VR development, this experimental scenario may soon represent a typical VR user experience. While virtual telepresence applications (and the so-called "metaverse") have recently received increased attention and investment from major tech firms, these environments remain relatively under-studied from a security and privacy standpoint. In this work, we illustrate how VR attackers can covertly ascertain dozens of personal data attributes from seemingly-anonymous users of popular metaverse applications like VRChat. These attackers can be as simple as other VR users without special privilege, and the potential scale and scope of this data collection far exceed what is feasible within traditional mobile and web applications. We aim to shed light on the unique privacy risks of the metaverse, and provide the first holistic framework for understanding intrusive data harvesting attacks in these emerging VR ecosystems.
翻译:30位研究参与者在虚拟现实(VR)中玩了一个看似无害的“ 越野室” 游戏。 在幕后,一个对抗性程序准确地推断出超过25个个人数据属性,从身高和翅膀等人体测量学到年龄和性别等人口特征,仅几分钟的游戏游戏。当数据饥饿公司越来越多地参与VR开发时,这种实验情景可能很快代表VR用户的典型经验。虽然虚拟远程应用(和所谓的“越野”)最近受到主要技术公司越来越多的关注和投资,但这些环境从安全和隐私的角度来说仍然相对没有受到足够的研究。在这项工作中,我们说明VR攻击者如何从VRChat等流行的现代应用的无名用户那里隐蔽地确定数十个个人数据属性。这些攻击者可以像VR用户一样简单,而且这种数据收集的潜在规模和范围远远超过传统移动和网络应用范围内的可行性。我们的目的是要揭示元vers的独特隐私风险,并为了解这些新兴的VR生态系统的入侵性数据采集提供第一个整体框架。