When banks fail amidst financial crises, the public criticizes regulators for bailing out or liquidating specific banks, especially the ones that gain attention due to their size or dominance. A comprehensive assessment of regulators, however, requires examining all their decisions, and not just specific ones, against the regulator's dual objective of preserving financial stability while discouraging moral hazard. In this article, we develop a Bayesian latent class estimation framework to assess regulators on these competing objectives and evaluate their decisions against resolution rules recommended by theoretical studies of bank behavior designed to contain moral hazard incentives. The proposed estimation framework addresses the unobserved heterogeneity underlying regulator's decisions in resolving failed banks and provides a disciplined statistical approach for inferring if they acted in the public interest. Our results reveal that during the crises of 1980's, the U.S. banking regulator's resolution decisions were consistent with recommended decision rules, while the U.S. savings and loans (S&L) regulator, which ultimately faced insolvency in 1989 at a cost of $132 billion to the taxpayer, had deviated from such recommendations. Timely interventions based on this evaluation could have redressed the S&L regulator's decision structure and prevented losses to taxpayers.
翻译:当银行在金融危机中失败时,公众批评监管者援助或清算特定银行,特别是那些因其规模或支配地位而引起注意的银行。然而,对监管者的全面评估要求对照监管者维护金融稳定的双重目标来审查他们的所有决定,而不仅仅是具体的决定。 在本篇文章中,我们制定了一个贝叶斯潜伏等级估算框架,以评估监管者对这些相互竞争的目标进行评估,并对照旨在包含道德风险激励措施的银行行为理论研究所建议的解决规则来评价其决定。拟议的估算框架针对监管者在解决破产银行时所作决定的未观察到的异质性,并提供了一种有纪律的统计方法,用以推断他们是否出于公共利益行事。我们的结果表明,在1980年代的危机期间,美国银行监管者所作决定符合建议的决定规则,而美国储蓄和贷款监管者(S&L)最终在1989年面临破产,纳税人付出了1 320亿美元的代价,他们偏离了此类建议。基于这一评估的及时干预措施本可纠正斯拉夫监管者的决定结构和防止损失纳税人。