For many differentially private algorithms, such as the prominent noisy stochastic gradient descent (DP-SGD), the analysis needed to bound the privacy leakage of a single training run is well understood. However, few studies have reasoned about the privacy leakage resulting from the multiple training runs needed to fine tune the value of the training algorithm's hyperparameters. In this work, we first illustrate how simply setting hyperparameters based on non-private training runs can leak private information. Motivated by this observation, we then provide privacy guarantees for hyperparameter search procedures within the framework of Renyi Differential Privacy. Our results improve and extend the work of Liu and Talwar (STOC 2019). Our analysis supports our previous observation that tuning hyperparameters does indeed leak private information, but we prove that, under certain assumptions, this leakage is modest, as long as each candidate training run needed to select hyperparameters is itself differentially private.
翻译:对于许多有差别的私人算法,例如著名的吵闹的悬浮梯度下降(DP-SGD),为限制单次训练的隐私泄漏而需要进行的分析是完全理解的。然而,很少有研究对为了微调训练算法超参数的价值而需要进行的多次训练造成的隐私泄漏进行了解释。在这项工作中,我们首先说明以非私人训练运行为基础简单设置超参数如何会泄漏私人信息。受这一观察的驱动,我们随后为Renyi差异隐私框架内的超光谱搜索程序提供隐私保障。我们的成果改进并扩展了刘和塔尔华的工作(STOC 2019)。我们的分析支持我们先前的观察,即调整超参数确实会泄露私人信息,但我们证明,根据某些假设,这种泄漏是微不足道的,只要选择超光谱仪所需的每次候选人培训本身是不同的私人培训,那么,我们所需要的超光谱仪是有限的。