微弱单调比较制表师 (Weak Monotone Comparative Statics)

We develop a theory of monotone comparative statics based on weak set order -- in short, weak monotone comparative statics -- and identify the enabling conditions in the context of individual choices, Pareto optimal choices, Nash equilibria of games, and matching theory. Compared with the existing theory based on strong set order, the conditions for weak monotone comparative statics are weaker, sometimes considerably, in terms of the structure of %the choice environments and underlying preferences of agents. We apply the theory to establish existence and monotone comparative statics of Nash equilibria in games with strategic complementarities and of stable many-to-one matchings in two-sided matching problems, allowing for general preferences that accommodate indifferences and incomplete preferences.

翻译：我们开发了单质比较静态的理论,其基础是薄弱的定序 -- -- 简言之,弱的单质比较静态 -- -- 并确定个人选择、Pareto最佳选择、Nash游戏平衡和匹配理论背景下的有利条件。与基于强质定序的现有理论相比,弱单质比较静态的条件较弱,有时甚至相当弱,在选择环境的%结构和代理人的基本偏好方面。我们运用该理论在具有战略互补性的游戏中建立纳什平衡的存在和单质比较静态,并在双面匹配问题上建立稳定的多对一匹配,允许满足漠视和不完全偏好的一般偏好。