Cooperatively planning for multiple agents has been proposed as a promising method for strategic and motion planning for automated vehicles. By taking into account the intent of every agent, the ego agent can incorporate future interactions with human-driven vehicles into its planning. The problem is often formulated as a multi-agent game and solved using iterative algorithms operating on a discretized action or state space. Even if converging to a Nash equilibrium, the result will often be only sub-optimal. In this paper, we define a linear differential game for a set of interacting agents and solve it to optimality using mixed-integer programming. A disjunctive formulation of the orientation allows us to formulate linear constraints to prevent agent-to-agent collision while preserving the non-holonomic motion properties of the vehicle model. Soft constraints account for prediction errors. We then define a joint cost function, where a cooperation factor can adapt between altruistic, cooperative, and egoistic behavior. We study the influence of the cooperation factor to solve scenarios, where interaction between the agents is necessary to solve them successfully. The approach is then evaluated in a racing scenario, where we show the applicability of the formulation in a closed-loop receding horizon replanning fashion. By accounting for inaccuracies in the cooperative assumption and the actual behavior, we can indeed successfully plan an optimal control strategy interacting closely with other agents.
翻译:多个代理商的合作规划被提议为自动车辆的战略和动作规划的一个有希望的方法。通过考虑每个代理商的意图,自我代理商可以将未来与人类驱动的车辆的互动纳入规划。问题往往被作为一种多试玩游戏,使用在离散的行动或国家空间操作的迭接算法加以解决。即使与纳什平衡相融合,结果往往也只是次最佳的。我们在本文件中为一组互动代理商界定了线性差别游戏,并用混合整齐的编程解决它的最佳性。对方向的不相容性表述使我们能够制定线性限制,以防止代理人与代理人的碰撞,同时保留车辆模型的非超光层运动特性。软性限制考虑到预测错误。我们然后确定一个联合成本功能,在这个功能中,一个合作因素可以适应利他、合作和自我主义的行为。我们研究了合作因素对解决各种设想的影响,在这些情况下,代理人之间必须进行互动才能成功地解决这些问题。然后在一种竞争假设中评估这一方法,这样我们就可以在设计时展示如何适用最佳做法的假设中,我们又能够成功地进行一种封闭式的假设。