Proof-of-Work (PoW) is the core security mechanism of Bitcoin, the first and financially biggest cryptocurrency. This concept began as an efficient spam e-mail mitigation technique. Meanwhile, it encountered several major security issues in the decentralized environment of blockchain. One of them is a Block WithHolding (BWH) attack that can exploit a widespread and cooperative environment called a mining pool. This attack takes advantage of untrustworthy relationships between mining pools and participating agents. Moreover, detecting or responding to attacks is challenging due to the nature of mining pools. In this paper, however, we suggest that BWH attacks also have a similar trust problem. Because a BWH attacker cannot have complete control over BWH agents, they can betray the belonging mining pool and seek further benefits by trading with victims. We prove that this betrayal is not only valid in all attack parameters but also provides double benefits; finally, it is the best strategy for BWH agents. Furthermore, our study implies that BWH attacks may encounter self-destruction of their own revenue, contrary to their intention.
翻译:Bitcoin(Bitcoin)的核心安全机制,这是第一个在财政上最大的隐秘货币。这个概念最初是一种高效的垃圾邮件缓解技术。同时,它遇到了在分散的链条环境中的一些重大安全问题。其中之一是 " 环绕 " (BWH)袭击,它可以开发一个广泛的合作环境,称为采矿池。这次袭击利用了采矿池与参与代理人之间不可信的关系。此外,发现或应对袭击由于采矿池的性质而具有挑战性。然而,我们在本文件中认为BWH袭击也存在类似的信任问题。由于BWH袭击者无法完全控制BWH代理物,他们可以背叛属于自己的采矿池,并通过与受害者交易寻求进一步的好处。我们证明,这种背叛不仅在所有攻击参数中都有效,而且还提供了双重好处;最后,这是BWH代理物的最佳战略。此外,我们的研究还表明,BWHE袭击可能违背其意图而遭到自毁。