Desirability can be understood as an extension of Anscombe and Aumann's Bayesian decision theory to sets of expected utilities. At the core of desirability lies an assumption of linearity of the scale in which rewards are measured. It is a traditional assumption used to derive the expected utility model, which clashes with a general representation of rational decision making, though. Allais has, in particular, pointed this out in 1953 with his famous paradox. We note that the utility scale plays the role of a closure operator when we regard desirability as a logical theory. This observation enables us to extend desirability to the nonlinear case by letting the utility scale be represented via a general closure operator. The new theory directly expresses rewards in actual nonlinear currency (money), much in Savage's spirit, while arguably weakening the founding assumptions to a minimum. We characterise the main properties of the new theory both from the perspective of sets of gambles and of their lower and upper prices (previsions). We show how Allais paradox finds a solution in the new theory, and discuss the role of sets of probabilities in the theory.
翻译:可取性可以理解为Anscombe和Aumann的Bayesian决定理论与预期公用事业系列的延伸。 可取性的核心在于假设衡量奖励的尺度的线性。 这是一个传统假设,用来得出预期的效用模型,它与理性决策的一般代表性相冲突。 Allais特别在1953年指出这一点及其著名的悖论。我们注意到,当我们把关闭操作员的作用视为可取性作为一个逻辑理论时,公用事业规模就起到关闭操作员的作用。这一观察使我们能够通过一个一般关闭操作员来代表公用事业规模,从而将可取性扩大到非线性案例。 新的理论直接以实际的非线性货币(金钱)表示奖励,这在Savage的精神中是很大的,但有可能将创始假设削弱到最低限度。 我们从赌局及其低价和上价的角度来描述新理论的主要特性。 我们展示了Alais悖论如何在新理论中找到解决办法,并讨论理论中的各种概率的作用。