As the number of prosumers with distributed energy resources (DERs) grows, the conventional centralized operation scheme may suffer from conflicting interests, privacy concerns, and incentive inadequacy. In this paper, we propose an energy sharing mechanism to address the above challenges. It takes into account network constraints and fairness among prosumers. In the proposed energy sharing market, all prosumers play a generalized Nash game. The market equilibrium is proved to have nice features in a large market or when it is a variational equilibrium. To deal with the possible market failure, inefficiency, or instability in general cases, we introduce a price regulation policy to avoid market power exploitation. The improved energy sharing mechanism with price regulation can guarantee existence and uniqueness of a socially near-optimal market equilibrium. Some advantageous properties are proved, such as prosumer's individual rationality, a sharing price structure similar to the locational marginal price, and the tendency towards social optimum with an increasing number of prosumers. For implementation, a practical bidding algorithm is developed with convergence condition. Experimental results validate the theoretical outcomes and show the practicability of our model and method.
翻译:随着分布式能源资源(DERs)的代理商数量的增加,常规集中经营计划可能因利益、隐私问题和奖励不足的矛盾而受到影响。在本文件中,我们提出一个能源分享机制,以应对上述挑战。它考虑到网络限制和代理商之间的公平性。在拟议的能源分享市场中,所有代理商都玩一种普惠的纳什游戏。市场平衡证明在大型市场或是一个变异平衡的情况下具有良好的特征。为了应对市场失灵、效率低下或一般情况下不稳定的可能性,我们实行价格管制政策,以避免市场权力的利用。改进的能源分享机制与价格管制可以保证社会上接近最佳的市场平衡的存在和独特性。一些有利条件已经证明,例如,Prosuper的个人合理性、类似于地点边际价格的共享结构以及与越来越多的代理商走向社会最佳的倾向。为了实施,一种实用的招标算法与趋同条件一起发展。实验结果证实了理论结果,并显示了我们的模式和方法的实用性。