一类可替代品的多对多拍卖中信息披露、机制优化及应用研究

项目名称： 一类可替代品的多对多拍卖中信息披露、机制优化及应用研究

项目编号： No.61273206

项目类型： 面上项目

立项/批准年度： 2013

项目学科： 自动化技术、计算机技术

项目作者： 赵勇

作者单位： 华中科技大学

项目金额： 75万元

中文摘要： 信息的隐藏和披露是拍卖机制设计和优化需要考虑的重要因素。在一些常见的多对多拍卖中，除了买者与卖者之间信息不对称外，买者与买者之间、卖者与卖者之间还存在着复杂的信息不对称问题，在这种信息结构下买卖者可以通过某种信号博弈来谋取"信息优势"、并影响相关机制实施的激励效果。本项目以网上拍卖为背景，结合多个Close Substitute物品（近似替代品）的序贯拍卖和同步拍卖，研究"信息披露"与激励机制、拍卖效率间的规律，分析和探讨目前一些商业网站中某些常用机制的改进和信号的优化、以及新产品信息发布对市场活动规律的影响等，旨在推动拍卖理论在实际经济活动中的应用。

中文关键词： 1信息披露；2激励机制；3多物品拍卖；信息结构；替代品

英文摘要： Information revealing or hiding is considered as an important factor affecting the auction mechanism design and optimization.In real auctions of multi-objects to multi-bidders,there exists information asymmetry among bidders or among auctioneers,as well as between bidders and auctioneers.Due to this complicated information structure,a bidder could gain his information advantage and cloud incentive effects of corresponding mechanisms by the use of special signaling games.Regarding the internet auction as a background,this project researches the sequential auction and the synchronous auction of close substitutes.To promote applications of auction theories in real economic activities,this research mainly focuses on the influences of information revealing on incentive mechanisms and auction efficiencies,and then probes into improvements of special mechanisms and optimizations of incentive signal presently used in some E-commerce sites.In addition,the influences of new product information revelations on market activities are also discussed.

英文关键词： 1Information Revelation；Incentive Mechanism；Multi-item Auction；Information Structure；Substitute