关键字营销市场中的机制设计与优化问题研究

项目名称： 关键字营销市场中的机制设计与优化问题研究

项目编号： No.71202169

项目类型： 青年科学基金项目

立项/批准年度： 2013

项目学科： 工商管理

项目作者： 李林静

作者单位： 中国科学院自动化研究所

项目金额： 23.5万元

中文摘要： 关键字营销是当前最为流行和有效的网络营销模式，吸引了大量的广告客户，并为各大广告平台提供了丰厚的利润。但该市场的进一步发展却受到其所用拍卖机制的制约，同时经典拍卖和机制设计理论尚不能对现实中面临的挑战给出有效的解决方案。本项目针对关键字营销中的市场机制设计与优化问题对理论研究和商业实践两个方面提出的重大挑战与需求，致力于从整体上解决关键字营销机制设计和优化问题，给出关键字市场的自适应细分方案，突破动态环境下拍卖机制的参数优化调整问题，并将市场负面行为的防范纳入机制的参数设计和优化过程中，从整体上降低欺诈性点击和恶意投标的经济激励。在此基础上，通过跟从事关键字营销业务的公司合作，对研究成果的有效性进行实际验证，推动研究成果的实际应用。本研究不仅能够丰富和发展现有的拍卖和机制设计等基础理论，同时也能为关键字营销市场的进一步健康发展和持续增长提供理论保障，具有重要的理论研究意义和商业实践价值。

中文关键词： 付费搜索；关键字营销；机制设计；博弈论；大数据

英文摘要： Keyword advertising is currently the most prevailing and effective online advertising instrument with a huge number of advertisers. It is also the most important and fastest-growing revenue source for the platforms. However, the increase of this market is damped by its auction mechanism adopted, what worse is the classical auction and mechanism design theory cannot help it overcoming this bottleneck. In front of this big while meaningful challenge, we strive to propose an integrated solution to the design and optimization of auction mechanism for the keyword advertising market and focus on the following three problems: the optimal partition of the whole keyword market into specific while more valuable small markets; the design of optimal auction mechanism under the dynamic environment; the using of parameters of the auction mechanism to prevent negative market behaviors, such as click frauds and vicious biddings，by reduce their economic incentives. Paralleling with these academic activities, we will evaluate our conclusions and algorithms in the real business system by collaborating with a platform. Our work can make contributions to both the developments of theory for auction and mechanism design and the increase of the sponsored advertising market in a more healthy way.

英文关键词： Sponsored Search；Keyword Advertising；Mechanism Design；Game Theory；Big Data