No Agreement Without Loss: Learning and Social Choice in Peer Review

In peer review systems, reviewers are often asked to evaluate various features of submissions, such as technical quality or novelty. A score is given to each of the predefined features and based on these the reviewer has to provide an overall quantitative recommendation. However, reviewers differ in how much they value different features. It may be assumed that each reviewer has her own mapping from a set of criteria scores (score vectors) to a recommendation, and that different reviewers have different mappings in mind. Recently, Noothigattu, Shah and Procaccia introduced a novel framework for obtaining an aggregated mapping by means of Empirical Risk Minimization based on $L(p,q)$ loss functions, and studied its axiomatic properties in the sense of social choice theory. We provide a body of new results about this framework. On the one hand we study a trade-off between strategy-proofness and the ability of the method to properly capture agreements of the majority of reviewers. On the other hand, we show that dropping a certain unrealistic assumption makes the previously reported results to be no longer valid. Moreover, in the general case, strategy-proofness fails dramatically in the sense that a reviewer is able to make significant changes to the solution in her favor by arbitrarily small changes to their true beliefs. In particular, no approximate version of strategy-proofness is possible in this general setting since the method is not even continuous w.r.t. the data. Finally we propose a modified aggregation algorithm which is continuous and show that it has good axiomatic properties.