The Russian invasion of Ukraine has sparked renewed interest in the phenomenon of brain drain: the exodus of human capital out of countries. Yet quantifying brain drain, especially in real time during crisis situations, remains difficult. This hinders our ability to understand its drivers and mechanisms and to anticipate its consequences. To address this gap, I draw on and extend a large scale dataset of the locations of highly active software developers collected in February 2021, one year before the invasion. Revisiting those developers that had been located in Russia in 2021, I confirm a significant exodus of developers from Russia by late June 2022. 8.6% of Russian developers list a new country, compared with 2.4% of developers from comparable countries in the region but not directly involved in the conflict. 11.3% of Russian developers have obscured their location (vs. 1.9% in the comparison set). Our data also allows us to observe heterogeneities in who leaves and who remains, and to see where they are going. Developers leaving Russia were significantly much more active and central in the collaboration network than those who stay behind. This suggests that the most important developers have already left Russia.
翻译:俄罗斯入侵乌克兰引发了对人才外流现象的新的兴趣:人力资本外流;然而,量化人才外流,特别是在危机局势中实时进行的人才外流,仍然困难重重。这妨碍了我们理解其驱动因素和机制以及预测其后果的能力。为弥补这一差距,我利用并扩展了2021年2月入侵前一年收集的高度活跃软件开发者所在地的大规模数据集。重新审查了2021年俄罗斯境内开发者,我证实2022年6月底俄罗斯的开发者大量外流。8.6%的俄罗斯开发者列出了一个新国家,而该区域可比国家开发者中2.4%没有直接卷入冲突。 11.3%的俄罗斯开发者模糊了他们的位置(比较集中为1.9% )。我们的数据还使我们能够观察离开俄罗斯和留下的人的异质,并查看他们去向。在合作网络中,离开俄罗斯的开发者比留在后面的人更加活跃和重要。这表明最重要的开发者已经离开了俄罗斯。