We investigate coexistence of an age optimizing network (AON) and a throughput optimizing network (TON) that access the same wireless spectrum band using a WiFi-like CSMA/CA based access. We consider two modes of long run coexistence: (a) networks compete with each other for spectrum access causing them to interfere and (b) networks cooperate and achieve non-interfering access. To model competition, we define a non-cooperative stage game parameterized by average age of the AON at the beginning of the stage, derive its mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE), and analyze the evolution of age and throughput over an infinitely repeated game in which each network plays the MSNE in every stage. Cooperation has a coordination device use a coin toss during each stage to select the network that must access the medium. Networks use the grim trigger punishment strategy, reverting to playing the MSNE every stage forever, if the other disobeys the device. We determine if there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium, that is the networks obey the device forever as they find cooperation beneficial. We find that networks choose to cooperate only when they have a small enough number of nodes. Else, they would rather disobey the device and compete.
翻译:我们用WiFi类的CSMA/CA访问,调查一个年龄优化网络(AON)和一个输出优化网络(TON)的共存情况,这些网络使用WiFi类的CSMA/CA的无线频谱波带,我们考虑两种长期共存模式:(a)网络相互竞争以获取频谱,造成干扰;(b)网络合作,实现非干扰接入。为了模拟竞争,我们定义了一个以AON在阶段开始的平均年龄为基准的非合作阶段游戏参数,得出其混合战略Nash均衡(MSNE),并分析年龄的演变和对每个网络在每一个阶段播放MSNE的无限重复游戏的吞吐。合作有一个协调装置,在每个阶段使用硬币选择必须进入媒体的网络。网络使用严酷的触发惩罚策略,如果其他网络不服从该装置,则永远恢复运行MSNE的每个阶段。我们确定是否有子组合的完美平衡,就是网络在发现合作的好处时永远服从该装置。我们发现网络选择合作,只有当它们拥有足够数量的无能竞争的装置时才会选择合作。