Password managers help users more effectively manage their passwords, encouraging them to adopt stronger passwords across their many accounts. In contrast to desktop systems where password managers receive no system-level support, mobile operating systems provide autofill frameworks designed to integrate with password managers to provide secure and usable autofill for browsers and other apps installed on mobile devices. In this paper, we evaluate mobile autofill frameworks on iOS and Android, examining whether they achieve substantive benefits over the ad-hoc desktop environment or become a problematic single point of failure. Our results find that while the frameworks address several common issues, they also enforce insecure behavior and fail to provide password managers sufficient information to override the frameworks' insecure behavior, resulting in mobile managers being less secure than their desktop counterparts overall. We also demonstrate how these frameworks act as a confused deputy in manager-assisted credential phishing attacks. Our results demonstrate the need for significant improvements to mobile autofill frameworks. We conclude the paper with recommendations for the design and implementation of secure autofill frameworks.
翻译:密码管理员帮助用户更有效地管理密码,鼓励他们在许多账户中采用更强的密码。与密码管理员得不到系统一级支持的桌面系统不同,移动操作系统提供自动填充框架,以便与密码管理员整合,为在移动设备上安装的浏览器和其他应用程序提供安全和可用的自动填充。在本文中,我们评价iOS和Android的移动自动填充框架,检查它们是否在临时桌面环境中取得实质性效益,还是成为一个有问题的单一失败点。我们的结果发现,虽然框架解决了若干共同问题,但它们也采取了不安全行为,没有提供足够的密码管理员信息来推翻框架的不安全行为,导致移动管理员比其桌面对应人员总体安全。我们还展示了这些框架如何在管理员协助的刻字式攻击中充当混乱的副手。我们的结果显示,需要大大改进移动自动填充框架。我们最后的文件提出了设计和实施安全自动填充框架的建议。