In the Group Identification problem, we are given a set of individuals and are asked to identify a socially qualified subset among them. Each individual in the set has an opinion about who should be considered socially qualified. There are several different rules that can be used to determine the socially qualified subset based on these mutual opinions. In a manipulative attack, an outsider attempts to exploit the way the used rule works, with the goal of changing the outcome of the selection process to their liking. In recent years, the complexity of group control and bribery based manipulative attacks in Group Identification has been the subject of intense research. However, the picture is far from complete, and there remain many open questions related to what exactly makes certain problems hard, or certain rules immune to some attacks. Supplementing previous results, we examine the complexity of group microbribery on so-called protective problem instances; that is, instances where all individuals from the constructive target set are already socially qualified initially. In addition, we study a relaxed variant of group control by deleting individuals for the consent rules, the consensus-start-respecting rule, and the liberal-start-respecting rule. Based on existing literature, we also formalize three new social rules of the iterative consensus type, and we provide a comprehensive complexity-theoretic analysis of group control and bribery problems for these rules.
翻译:在团体识别问题中,我们得到了一组个人,并被要求查明其中哪些人具有社会资格,每组中的每个人对哪些人应被认为具有社会资格持有意见。根据这些相互意见,可以使用若干不同的规则来确定具有社会资格的子组。在操纵式攻击中,一个外来者试图利用所用规则的运作方式,目的是将甄选过程的结果改变为他们所喜欢的。近年来,集团身份识别中集团控制和贿赂操纵性攻击的复杂性一直是密集研究的主题。然而,情况远未完成,而且对于究竟哪些问题确实使某些问题变得困难,或某些规则对一些攻击没有影响,仍有许多尚未解决的问题。我们补充了以前的结果,我们研究了所谓的保护问题案例中群体微贿赂的复杂性;这就是,建设性目标组中的所有个人最初都已经具有社会资格。此外,我们研究了群体控制较宽松的变式,即删除同意规则的个人、协商一致启动规则,以及自由开始规则。根据现有文献,我们还正式确定了三种新的社会等级规则,我们对这些共识的复杂程度进行了反复分析。