We study the single-choice prophet inequality problem, where a gambler faces a sequence of $n$ online i.i.d. random variables drawn from an unknown distribution. When a variable reveals its value, the gambler needs to decide irrevocably whether or not to accept it. The goal is to maximize the competitive ratio between the expected gain of the gambler and that of the maximum variable. It is shown by Correa et al. that when the distribution is unknown or only $o(n)$ uniform samples from the distribution are given, the best an algorithm can do is $1/e$-competitive. In contrast, when the distribution is known or $\Omega(n)$ uniform samples are given, the optimal competitive ratio 0.7451 can be achieved. In this paper, we propose a new model in which the algorithm has access to an oracle that answers quantile queries about the distribution, and study the extent to which we can use a small number of queries to achieve good competitive ratios. Naturally, by making queries to the oracle, one can implement the threshold-based blind strategies that use the answers from the queries as thresholds to accept variables. Our first contribution is to prove that the competitive ratio improves gracefully with the number of thresholds. Particularly with two thresholds our algorithm achieves a competitive ratio of 0.6786. Our second contribution, surprisingly, shows that with a single query, we can do strictly better than with a single threshold. The algorithm sets a threshold in the first phase by making a single query and uses the maximum realization from the first phase as the threshold for the second phase. It can be viewed as a natural combination of the single-threshold algorithm and the algorithm for the secretary problem. By properly choosing the quantile to query and the break-point between the two phases, we achieve a competitive ratio of 0.6718.
翻译:我们研究了单选预言人不平等问题, 赌徒在网上面临一连串一美元( id) 。 从未知分布中抽取的随机变量。 当变量显示其价值时, 赌徒需要不可逆转地决定是否接受它。 我们的目标是使赌徒预期得益与最大变量之间的竞争比重最大化。 科雷亚等人指出, 当分布未知或只有美元( n) 统一分布样本时, 算法能做的最好的是1美元/ e- e- 竞争。 相反, 当分配为已知或美元( n) 提供统一样本时, 赌徒需要无可挽回地决定是否接受它的价值。 在本文中, 我们提出了一个新的模型, 算法可以解答关于分配的松动性询问, 并研究我们使用少量查询来达到良好的竞争比率。 当然, 向奥赛尔的第二个算可以执行基于门槛的战略, 并且用从0. 0. 7 3 标的答案来正确选择一个最低水平 。 我们的算算算算算算出一个最低比率 。