Internet of Things (IoT) applications drive the behavior of IoT deployments according to installed sensors and actuators. It has recently been shown that IoT deployments are vulnerable to physical interactions, caused by design flaws or malicious intent, that can have severe physical consequences. Yet, extant approaches to securing IoT do not translate the app source code into its physical behavior to evaluate physical interactions. Thus, IoT consumers and markets do not possess the capability to assess the safety and security risks these interactions present. In this paper, we introduce the IoTSeer security service for IoT deployments, which uncovers undesired states caused by physical interactions. IoTSeer operates in four phases (1) translation of each actuation command and sensor event in an app source code into a hybrid I/O automaton that defines an app's physical behavior, (2) combining apps in a novel composite automaton that represents the joint physical behavior of interacting apps, (3) applying grid-based testing and falsification to validate whether an IoT deployment conforms to desired physical interaction policies, and (4) identification of the root cause of policy violations and proposing patches that guide users to prevent them. We use IoTSeer in an actual house with 13 actuators and six sensors with 37 apps and demonstrate its effectiveness and performance.
翻译:根据已安装的传感器和启动器,IOT应用软件(IOT)的应用程序驱动IOT部署行为。最近已经表明,IOT部署由于设计缺陷或恶意意图而容易发生物理互动,这可能造成严重的物理后果。然而,现有的确保IOT应用源代码的方法并没有将应用程序源代码转化为评估物理互动的物理行为。因此,IOT消费者和市场不具备评估这些互动的安全和安保风险的能力。在本文件中,我们介绍了IOTSeer应用的IOTSeer安全服务,以验证IOT部署是否符合所需的物理互动政策,IOTSeer运行分为四个阶段:(1) 将应用程序源代码中的每个动作指令和传感器事件转换为混合的I/OAutomaton,该代码定义了应用程序的物理行为,(2) 将代表互动应用程序联合物理行为的新合成自动图中的应用程序合并在一起。(3) 应用基于网格的测试和伪造来验证IOT部署是否符合所需的物理互动政策,(4) 将政策违规的根源与13号用户的实际行为演示。