Governments, Healthcare, and Private Organizations in the global scale have been using digital tracking to keep COVID-19 outbreaks under control. Although this method could limit pandemic contagion, it raises significant concerns about user privacy. Known as ~"Contact Tracing Apps", these mobile applications are facilitated by Cellphone Service Providers (CSPs), who enable the spatial and temporal real-time user tracking. Accordingly, it might be speculated that CSPs collect information violating the privacy policies such as GDPR, CCPA, and others. To further clarify, we conducted an in-depth analysis comparing privacy legislations with the real-world practices adapted by CSPs. We found that three of the regulations (GDPR, COPPA, and CCPA) analyzed defined mobile location data as private information, and two (T-Mobile US, Boost Mobile) of the five CSPs that were analyzed did not comply with the COPPA regulation. Our results are crucial in view of the threat these violations represent, especially when it comes to children's data. As such proper security and privacy auditing is necessary to curtail such violations. We conclude by providing actionable recommendations to address concerns and provide privacy-preserving monitoring of the COVID-19 spread through the contact tracing applications.
翻译:虽然这种方法可以限制流行病的传染,但引起了对用户隐私的重大关切。我们发现,三项条例(GDPR、COPPA和CCPA)将界定的移动地点数据分析为私人信息,而所分析的5个CSP的2个(T-Mobile United Nations, Bowest Movement)则不符合COPPA的条例。我们的结论是,鉴于这些侵犯行为所构成的威胁,特别是对儿童数据的威胁,我们的结果至关重要。这种适当的安全和隐私审计对于遏制这种侵犯行为是必要的。我们的结论是,通过提供可采取行动的建议,通过监测的方式处理各种关注问题,并提供CO-19的追踪。