In this paper we report on the results of selected horizontal SCA attacks against two open-source designs that implement hardware accelerators for elliptic curve cryptography. Both designs use the complete addition formula to make the point addition and point doubling operations indistinguishable. One of the designs uses in addition means to randomize the operation sequence as a countermeasure. We used the comparison to the mean and an automated SPA to attack both designs. Despite all these countermeasures, we were able to extract the keys processed with a correctness of 100%.
翻译:在本文中,我们报告了对两种使用离子曲线加密硬件加速器的开放源码设计进行选定的横向SCA攻击的结果。两种设计都使用完整的附加公式来增加点数并点出双倍操作无法区分。其中一种设计还使用随机调整操作序列作为反措施。我们用与平均值的比较和自动的SPA来攻击两种设计。尽管采取了所有这些对策,我们还是能够以100%的正确率提取处理的钥匙。