Major families of pairing-friendly elliptic curves, including BN, BLS12, BLS24, KSS16, and KSS18 have recently been vulnerable to number field sieve (NFS) attacks. Due to the recent attacks on discrete logs in F_(q^k ), selecting such curves became relevant again. This paper revisited the topic of selecting pairing-friendly curves at different security levels. First, we expanded the classification given by Freeman et al. [1] by identifying new families that were not previously mentioned, such as a complete family with variable differentiation and new sparse families of curves. We discussed individual curves and a comprehensive framework for constructing parametric families. We estimated the security and assessed families of the pairing-friendly curve to discover families of curves better than BN, KSS, and BLS in terms of the required key size. We also evaluated the complexity of the optimal ate pairing that has never been discussed before, except by Barbulescu et al. [2]. We demonstrated that the recent attack (TNFS) on pairing needs to increase the key size. We compared families of curves in the context of key size and selected a suitable alternative to an elliptic curve.
翻译:包括BN、BLS12、BLS24、KSS16和KSS18在内的爱配对的椭圆曲线的主要家庭,包括BN、BLS12、BLS24、KSS16、KSS18等,最近很容易受到数字筛选(NFS)攻击。由于最近F_(q ⁇ k)对离散日志的攻击,选择这种曲线又变得相关。本文件再次讨论了在不同安全级别选择对配对友好的曲线的主题。首先,我们扩大了Freeman等人提供的分类[1],确定了以前未曾提到的新的家庭,例如一个有差异的完整家庭和新的曲线稀少家庭。我们讨论了单项曲线和构建准参数家庭的全面框架。我们从所需的关键大小的角度估计了对配对的曲线的安全和对口,并评估了对对对对口曲线的家属,以便发现比BN、KSS和BLS更好的曲线家属。我们还评估了以前从未讨论过的最佳对口线的复杂性,Barbulesscu等人除外。我们证明,最近关于配对口攻击需要增加关键尺寸和视线的替代曲线大小。我们比较了选定的关键曲线的曲线的曲线。我们比较了选定的曲线。在关键大小方面选择的曲线的曲线的家属。我们比较了。