Risk-based authentication (RBA) extends authentication mechanisms to make them more robust against account takeover attacks, such as those using stolen passwords. RBA is recommended by NIST and NCSC to strengthen password-based authentication, and is already used by major online services. Also, users consider RBA to be more usable than two-factor authentication and just as secure. However, users currently obtain RBA's high security and usability benefits at the cost of exposing potentially sensitive personal data (e.g., IP address or browser information). This conflicts with user privacy and requires to consider user rights regarding the processing of personal data. We outline potential privacy challenges regarding different attacker models and propose improvements to balance privacy in RBA systems. To estimate the properties of the privacy-preserving RBA enhancements in practical environments, we evaluated a subset of them with long-term data from 780 users of a real-world online service. Our results show the potential to increase privacy in RBA solutions. However, it is limited to certain parameters that should guide RBA design to protect privacy. We outline research directions that need to be considered to achieve a widespread adoption of privacy preserving RBA with high user acceptance.
翻译:以风险为基础的认证(RBA)扩大了认证机制,使其在账户接管攻击(例如使用窃取密码的攻击)时更加有力。 NIST和NCSC建议RBA加强基于密码的认证,并已被主要在线服务使用。此外,用户认为RBA比两个因素的认证更便于使用,而且同样安全。然而,目前用户以暴露潜在敏感个人数据(例如IP地址或浏览器信息)为代价,获得了RBA的高安全和可用性好处。这与用户隐私有冲突,需要考虑处理个人数据的用户权利。我们概述了不同攻击者模式的潜在隐私挑战,并提出了改进RBA系统隐私的改进建议。为了估计在实际环境中维护隐私的RBA强化措施的特性,我们用来自780个实际世界在线服务用户的长期数据对其中的一组数据进行了评估。我们的结果显示,有可能增加RBA解决方案的隐私。然而,这仅限于指导RBA保护隐私设计的某些参数。我们概述了研究方向,需要考虑广泛采用隐私保护RBA的高用户接受。