A wide gamut of important applications rely on global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) for precise time and positioning. Attackers dictating the GNSS receiver position and time solution are a significant risk, especially due to the inherent vulnerability of GNSS systems. A first line of defense, for a large number of receivers, is to rely on additional information obtained through the rich connectivity of GNSS enabled platforms. Network time can be used for direct validation of the GNSS receiver time; but this depends on network availability. To allow attack detection even when there are prolonged network disconnections, we present a method based on on-board ensemble of reference clocks. This allows the receiver to detect sophisticated attacks affecting the GNSS time solution, independently of the specific attack methodology. Results obtained with Chip-Scale Oven Compensated Oscillators (CS-OCXO) are promising and demonstrate the potential of embedded ensembles of reference clocks, detecting attacks causing modifications of the receiver time offset as low as 0.3us, with half the detection latency compared to related literature.
翻译:在精确的时间和定位方面,许多重要应用都依赖于全球导航卫星系统(GNSS)的精确时间和定位。设计全球导航卫星系统接收器位置和时间解决方案的进攻者是一个重大风险,特别是由于全球导航卫星系统系统的固有脆弱性。对于大量接收器而言,第一道防线是依赖通过全球导航卫星系统启用平台的丰富连通性获得的额外信息。网络时间可用于直接验证全球导航卫星系统接收器的时间;但这取决于网络的可用性。即使网络长期断裂,为了能够探测攻击,我们根据参照时数的机载组合,提出一种方法。这样,接收器就可以在不使用特定攻击方法的情况下,探测影响全球导航卫星系统时间解决方案的尖端袭击。与芯片-系统合成观测器(CS-OCXO)取得的结果很有希望,并表明嵌入的参照时表组合的潜力,探测导致接收器时间被减低0.3us的攻击,与相关文献相比,探测时间为一半。