Quantum Machine Learning (QML) amalgamates quantum computing paradigms with machine learning models, providing significant prospects for solving complex problems. However, with the expansion of numerous third-party vendors in the Noisy Intermediate-Scale Quantum (NISQ) era of quantum computing, the security of QML models is of prime importance, particularly against reverse engineering, which could expose trained parameters and algorithms of the models. We assume the untrusted quantum cloud provider is an adversary having white-box access to the transpiled user-designed trained QML model during inference. Reverse engineering (RE) to extract the pre-transpiled QML circuit will enable re-transpilation and usage of the model for various hardware with completely different native gate sets and even different qubit technology. Such flexibility may not be obtained from the transpiled circuit which is tied to a particular hardware and qubit technology. The information about the number of parameters, and optimized values can allow further training of the QML model to alter the QML model, tamper with the watermark, and/or embed their own watermark or refine the model for other purposes. In this first effort to investigate the RE of QML circuits, we perform RE and compare the training accuracy of original and reverse-engineered Quantum Neural Networks (QNNs) of various sizes. We note that multi-qubit classifiers can be reverse-engineered under specific conditions with a mean error of order 1e-2 in a reasonable time. We also propose adding dummy fixed parametric gates in the QML models to increase the RE overhead for defense. For instance, adding 2 dummy qubits and 2 layers increases the overhead by ~1.76 times for a classifier with 2 qubits and 3 layers with a performance overhead of less than 9%. We note that RE is a very powerful attack model which warrants further efforts on defenses.
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