We present a strategy-proof public goods budgeting mechanism where agents determine both the total volume of expanses and the specific allocation. It is constructed as a modification of VCG to a less typical environment, namely where we do not assume quasi-linear utilities nor direct revelation. We further show that under plausible assumptions it satisfies strategy-proofness in strictly dominant strategies, and consequently implements the social optimum as a Coalition Proof Nash Equilibrium. A primary (albeit not an exclusive) motivation of our model is Participatory Budgeting, where members of a community collectively decide the spending policy of public tax dollars. While incentives alignment in our mechanism, as in classic VCG, is achieved via individual payments we charge from agents, in a PB context that seems unreasonable. Our second main result thus provides that, under further specifications relevant in that context, these payments will vanish in large populations. In the last section we expand the mechanism's definition to a class of mechanisms in which the designer can prioritize certain outcomes she sees as desirable. In particular we give the example of favoring equitable (egalitarian) allocations.
翻译:我们提出了一个不受战略约束的公益物预算编制机制,由代理商决定扩张总量和具体分配量,这是将VCG改造为不那么典型的环境,即我们不承担准线性公用事业,也不直接披露;我们进一步表明,根据合理的假设,它符合严格主导战略的战略的可核实性,因此作为Union Nash Equilibrium实施社会最佳办法。我们模式的主要(尽管不是排他性的)动机是参与性预算编制,社区成员集体决定公共税收支出政策。在典型的VCG中,我们的机制的激励一致是通过我们向代理商收取的个人付款实现的,而在PB中似乎不合理的,我们的第二个主要结果因此规定,根据与此有关的进一步规定,这些付款将在大量人口中消失。在最后一节中,我们将这一机制的定义扩大到一种机制,使设计师能够确定她认为可取的某些成果的优先次序。我们特别举了一个范例,即赞成公平(不公平)分配。</s>