As cache-based side-channel attacks become serious security problems, various defenses have been proposed and deployed in both software and hardware. Consequently, cache-based side-channel attacks on processes co-residing on the same core are becoming extremely difficult. Most of recent attacks then shift their focus to the last-level cache (LLC). Although cache partitioning is currently the most promising defense against the attacks abusing LLC, it is ineffective in thwarting the side-channel attacks that automatically create eviction sets or bypass the user address space layout randomization. In fact, these attacks are largely undefended in current computer systems. We propose Remapped Cache Layout (\textsf{RCL}) -- a pure hardware defense against a broad range of conflict-based side-channel attacks. \textsf{RCL} obfuscates the mapping from address to cache sets; therefore, an attacker cannot accurately infer the location of her data in caches or using a cache set to infer her victim's data. To our best knowledge, it is the first defense to thwart the aforementioned largely undefended side-channel attacks . \textsf{RCL} has been implemented in a superscalar processor and detailed evaluation results show that \textsf{RCL} incurs only small costs in area, frequency and execution time.
翻译:由于缓冲侧通道袭击已成为严重的安全问题,因此已经提出各种防御,并在软件和硬件中部署了各种防御。因此,对在同一核心上共同连接的进程的缓冲侧通道袭击正在变得极其困难。最近的大多数袭击随后将焦点转移到最后一级缓冲。虽然缓冲分割目前是最有希望的防范滥用有限责任公司的袭击,但对于阻止自动创建驱逐装置或绕过用户地址空间布局随机设计的侧通道袭击是无效的。事实上,这些袭击基本上在目前的计算机系统中没有防守。我们建议重塑缓冲布局(\ textsf{RCL}) -- -- 一种纯粹的硬件防御,以对抗广泛的基于冲突侧通道袭击。\ textsf{RCL} 将地图从地址到缓冲库进行模糊;因此,攻击者无法准确地推断其数据在缓冲处的位置,或者使用缓冲器来推断受害者的数据。我们最了解的是,我们第一次在前方系统中挫败上述基本上未设的缓冲缓冲缓冲的缓冲布布布线{CRtal-rodeal a decal rodudustral roduction acal roduction acal rodududududududududududududustrL_L_rodududududududududududustrL_ rodudududucs