Motivated by packet routing in computer networks, online queuing systems are composed of queues receiving packets at different rates. Repeatedly, they send packets to servers, each of them treating only at most one packet at a time. In the centralized case, the number of accumulated packets remains bounded (i.e., the system is \textit{stable}) as long as the ratio between service rates and arrival rates is larger than $1$. In the decentralized case, individual no-regret strategies ensures stability when this ratio is larger than $2$. Yet, myopically minimizing regret disregards the long term effects due to the carryover of packets to further rounds. On the other hand, minimizing long term costs leads to stable Nash equilibria as soon as the ratio exceeds $\frac{e}{e-1}$. Stability with decentralized learning strategies with a ratio below $2$ was a major remaining question. We first argue that for ratios up to $2$, cooperation is required for stability of learning strategies, as selfish minimization of policy regret, a \textit{patient} notion of regret, might indeed still be unstable in this case. We therefore consider cooperative queues and propose the first learning decentralized algorithm guaranteeing stability of the system as long as the ratio of rates is larger than $1$, thus reaching performances comparable to centralized strategies.
翻译:在计算机网络中,在线排队系统由以不同费率接收包件的队列组成。 反复地, 他们向服务器发送包件, 每个包件每次只处理最多一个包件。 在集中的情况下, 只要服务率和抵达率之间的比重大于1美元, 则累积包件的数量仍然受约束( 即, 系统是textit{ e- sable} ) 。 在分散化的情况下, 个别的不批准战略在比率超过2美元时, 就能确保稳定性。 然而, 微乎其微地将遗憾降到最低程度, 忽略了由于将包件结转到以后的回合而带来的长期影响。 另一方面, 尽可能减少长期费用, 当比例超过$\frac{ { e_ e-1} 美元时, 累积的包件数量就会保持稳定( 系统是troducal swility ) 。 我们首先认为, 将学习战略稳定化为2美元以上, 需要合作, 作为政策最自私的最小性最小化, 达到 的中继者, 最接近于 核心性 学习率, 因此, 我们认为, 递增 递增 的 。