We study the formation of stable outcomes via simple dynamics in cardinal hedonic games, where the utilities of agents change over time depending on the history of the coalition formation process. Specifically, we analyze situations where members of a coalition decrease their utility for a leaving agent (resent) or increase their utility for a joining agent (appreciation). We show that in contrast to classical dynamics, for resentful or appreciative agents, dynamics are guaranteed to converge under mild conditions for various stability concepts. Thereby, we establish that both resent and appreciation are strong stability-driving forces.
翻译:我们研究的是通过简单的动态来形成稳定的结果。 在这种动态中,代理商的公用设施随时间变化取决于联盟形成过程的历史。 具体地说,我们分析联盟成员降低其对于离开代理商的效用(拒绝)或增加其对于加入代理商的效用(欣赏 ) 。 我们表明,与古典动态相反,对于怨恨或欣赏代理商,动态保证在各种稳定概念的温和条件下汇合。 因此,我们确定,怨恨和欣赏都是强大的稳定驱动力量。