A powerful feature in mechanism design is the ability to irrevocably commit to the rules of a mechanism. Commitment is achieved by public declaration, which enables players to verify incentive properties in advance and the outcome in retrospect. However, public declaration can reveal superfluous information that the mechanism designer might prefer not to disclose, such as her target function or private costs. Avoiding this may be possible via a trusted mediator; however, the availability of a trusted mediator, especially if mechanism secrecy must be maintained for years, might be unrealistic. We propose a new approach to commitment, and show how to commit to, and run, any given mechanism without disclosing it, while enabling the verification of incentive properties and the outcome -- all without the need for any mediators. Our framework is based on zero-knowledge proofs -- a cornerstone of modern cryptographic theory. Applications include non-mediated bargaining with hidden yet binding offers.
翻译:机制设计的一个强有力的特征是能够不可逆转地承诺遵守机制的规则。承诺是通过公开声明实现的,使参与者能够事先核实奖励性财产和事后检查结果。然而,公开声明可以揭示机制设计者可能不愿披露的多余信息,例如其目标功能或私人费用。避免这种情况可能通过信任的调解人而成为可能;然而,提供可信赖的调解人,特别是机制保密必须维持多年,可能是不现实的。我们提出了新的承诺办法,并表明如何承诺和运行任何特定机制而不披露,同时允许核查奖励性财产和结果 -- -- 所有这些都不需要任何调解人参与。我们的框架基于零知识证明 -- -- 现代加密理论的基石。应用程序包括以隐藏但具有约束力的提议进行非中介谈判。