Simple and Rigorous Proof Method for Practical Security of Quantum Key Distribution in the Single-Qubit Regime Using Mismatched Basis Measurements

Quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols aim at allowing two parties to generate a secret shared key. While many QKD protocols have been proven unconditionally secure in theory, practical security analyses of experimental QKD implementations typically do not take into account all possible loopholes, and practical devices are still not fully characterized for obtaining tight and realistic key rates. We present a simple method of computing secure key rates for any practical implementation of discrete-variable QKD (which can also apply to measurement-device-independent QKD), initially in the single-qubit regime, and we rigorously prove its unconditional security against any possible attack. We hope our method becomes one of the standard tools used for analyzing, benchmarking, and standardizing all practical realizations of QKD.