We explore the security of residential routers and find a range of critical vulnerabilities. Our evaluations show that 10 out of 36 popular routers are vulnerable to injections of fake records via misinterpretation of special characters. We also find that in 15 of the 36 routers the mechanisms, that are meant to prevent cache poisoning attacks, can be circumvented. In our Internet-wide study with an advertisement network, we identified and analyzed 976 residential routers used by web clients, out of which more than 95% were found vulnerable to our attacks. Overall, vulnerable routers are prevalent and are distributed among 177 countries and 4830 networks. To understand the core factors causing the vulnerabilities we perform black- and white-box analyses of the routers. We find that many problems can be attributed to incorrect assumptions on the protocols' behaviour and the Internet, misunderstanding of the standard recommendations, bugs, and simplified DNS software implementations. We provide recommendations to mitigate our attacks. We also set up a tool to enable everyone to evaluate the security of their routers at https://xdi-attack.net/.
翻译:我们还发现,在36个路由器中,有15个路由器中,可以绕过旨在防止缓冲中毒袭击的机制。在互联网上与广告网络进行的研究中,我们发现并分析了网络客户使用的976个住宅路由器,其中95%以上被发现易受攻击。总体而言,弱势路由器很普遍,分布在177个国家和4830个网络中。为了了解造成我们对路由器进行黑白盒分析的弱点的核心因素。我们发现,许多问题可归因于对协议行为和互联网的错误假设,对标准建议、错误和简化DNS软件执行的误解。我们提供了减轻攻击的建议。我们还在https://xdi-action.net/上设置了一个工具,使每个人都能够评估其路由器的安全。