Noisy Intermediate-Scale Quantum (NISQ) quantum computers are being rapidly improved, with bigger numbers of qubits and improved fidelity. The rapidly increasing qubit counts and improving the fidelity of quantum computers will enable novel algorithms to be executed on the quantum computers, and generate novel results and data whose intellectual property will be a highly-guarded secret. At the same time, quantum computers are likely to remain specialized machines, and many will be controlled and maintained in a remote, cloud-based environment where end users who want to come up with novel algorithms have no control over the physical space. Lack of physical control by users means that physical attacks could be possible, by malicious insiders in the data center, for example. This work shows for the first time that power-based side-channel attacks could be deployed against quantum computers. The attacks could be used to recover information about the control pulses sent to quantum computers. From the control pulses, the gate level description of the circuits, and eventually the secret algorithms can be reverse engineered. This work demonstrates how and what information could be recovered, and then in turn how to defend from power-based side-channels. Real control pulse information from real quantum computers is used to demonstrate potential power-based side-channel attacks. Meanwhile, proposed defenses can be deployed already today, without hardware changes.
翻译:噪声中间规模量子计算机正在快速改进,具有更大的量子比特数和更高的保真度。快速增加的量子比特数和提高的保真度将使得新颖的算法能够在量子计算机上执行,并生成新的结果和数据,其知识产权将是高度保密的秘密。同时,量子计算机可能仍然是专用机器,很多人将在远程云环境下控制和维护它们,而希望提出新算法的最终用户无法对物理空间进行控制。用户缺乏物理控制意味着物理攻击可能是可能的,例如由数据中心内部的恶意人员进行的攻击。本文首次展示了量子计算机可以遭受基于能耗的侧信道攻击。攻击可以用于恢复有关发送到量子计算机的控制脉冲的信息。从控制脉冲中,可以反向工程出门级描述电路,最终得到秘密算法。本文演示了可以恢复哪些信息,以及如何防御基于能耗的侧信道攻击。真实的量子计算机控制脉冲信息用于展示潜在的基于能耗的侧信道攻击。同时,提议的防御已经可以在今天部署,无需更改硬件。