The development of automated gate specification for quantum communications and quantum networked computation opens up the way for malware designed at corrupting the automation software, changing the automated quantum communications protocols and algorithms. We study two types of attacks on automated quantum communications protocols and simulate these attacks on the superdense coding protocol, using remote access to IBM's Quantum Computers available through IBM Q Experience to simulate these attacks on what would be a low noise quantum communications network. The first type of attack leads to a hacker-controlled bijective transformation of the final measured strings, the second type of attack is a unitary scrambling attack that modifies the automated gate specification to effectively scramble the final measurement, disrupting quantum communications and taking advantage of quantum randomness upon measurement in a way that makes it difficult to distinguish from hardware malfunction or from a sudden rise in environmental noise. We show that, due to quantum entanglement and symmetries, the second type of attack works as a way to strategically disrupt quantum communications networks and quantum networked computation in a way that makes it difficult to ascertain which node was attacked. The main findings are discussed in the wider setting of quantum cybersecurity and quantum networked computation, where ways of hacking including the role of insider threats are discussed.
翻译:为量子通信和量子网络计算开发自动门规格,打开了设计恶意软件的途径,目的是腐蚀自动化软件,改变自动量子通信协议和算法。我们研究了两种类型的对自动量子通信协议的攻击,并模拟了对超常编码协议的攻击,利用IBM 的量子计算机的远程访问,模拟了对低噪音量子通信网络的这些攻击。第一种攻击导致由黑客控制的对最后计量字符串进行由黑客控制的双向转换,第二种攻击是单一的拼接式攻击,改变自动门规格,以有效地调整最后测量、中断量子通信,并利用测量时的量子随机性,从而难以区分硬件故障或环境噪音的突然上升。我们表明,由于量子缠绕和对称通信网络,第二类攻击工作是战略上扰乱量子通信网络和量子网络计算的方法,从而难以确定哪些点子通信网络受到攻击。主要结论在较广的量子和量子网络内部进行计算时讨论,其中包括对量子和量子网络的计算方法进行更广泛的分析。