Crowdsourcing is an effective method to collect data by employing distributed human population. Researchers introduce appropriate reward mechanisms to incentivize agents to report accurately. In particular, this paper focuses on Peer-Based Mechanisms (PBMs). We observe that with PBMs, crowdsourcing systems may not be fair, i.e., agents may not receive the deserved rewards despite investing efforts and reporting truthfully. Unfair rewards for the agents may discourage participation. This paper aims to build a general framework that assures fairness for PBMs in temporal settings, i.e., settings that prefer early reports. Towards this, we introduce two general notions of fairness for PBMs, namely gamma-fairness and qualitative fairness. To satisfy these notions, our framework provides trustworthy agents with additional chances of pairing. We introduce Temporal Reputation Model (TERM) to quantify agents' trustworthiness across tasks. With TERM as the key constituent, we present our iterative framework, REFORM, that can adopt the reward scheme of any existing PBM. We demonstrate REFORM's significance by deploying the framework with RPTSC's reward scheme. Specifically, we prove that REFORM with RPTSC considerably improves fairness; while incentivizing truthful and early reports. We conduct synthetic simulations and show that our framework provides improved fairness over RPTSC.
翻译:利用分布式人口收集数据的有效方法是众包。研究人员采用适当的奖励机制,鼓励代理人准确报告。特别是,本文件侧重于同侪机制。我们发现,利用个人银行,众包系统可能不公平,也就是说,尽管投资努力和诚实报告,但代理人可能得不到应得的报酬。对代理人的不公平奖励可能不利于参与。本文旨在建立一个总框架,确保个人银行在时间环境中的公平性,即选择早期报告的设置。为此,我们引入了两种对个人银行公平性的一般概念,即伽玛公平性和质量公平性。为了满足这些概念,我们的框架为可信赖的代理人提供了更多的配对机会。我们采用了“时间价值模型”来量化代理人在各项任务中的可信赖性。用关键成分来说明我们可采用任何现有个人银行的奖赏办法的迭代框架(REFORM)。我们通过使用区域银行银行的奖赏计划来展示REFORM的意义。具体地说,我们通过区域银行的奖赏计划部署框架,即伽玛公平性和质公平性。我们证明,在对亚太银行的早期模拟中,我们以诚实性报告来大大改进。