Blockchains have witnessed widespread adoption in the past decade in various fields. The growing demand makes their scalability and sustainability challenges more evident than ever. As a result, more and more blockchains have begun to adopt proof-of-stake (PoS) consensus protocols to address those challenges. One of the fundamental characteristics of any blockchain technology is its crypto-economics and incentives. Lately, each PoS blockchain has designed a unique reward mechanism, yet, many of them are prone to free-rider and nothing-at-stake problems. To better understand the ad-hoc design of reward mechanisms, in this paper, we develop a reward mechanism framework that could apply to many PoS blockchains. We formulate the block validation game wherein the rewards are distributed for validating the blocks correctly. Using evolutionary game theory, we analyze how the participants' behaviour could potentially evolve with the reward mechanism. Also, penalties are found to play a central role in maintaining the integrity of blockchains.
翻译:过去十年来,各种领域广泛采用封锁链。不断增长的需求使得其可伸缩性和可持续性挑战比以往任何时候都更加明显。因此,越来越多的封锁链开始采用“控制”共识协议来应对这些挑战。任何封锁链技术的基本特征之一是其隐秘经济学和激励。最近,每个泡沫链都设计了一个独特的奖赏机制,然而,它们中的许多人容易遇到免费搭车和无所事事的问题。为了更好地了解奖励机制的临时设计,我们在本文中制定了一个奖励机制框架,可以适用于许多“控制”链。我们制定了用于正确验证这些障碍的奖赏分配的区块验证游戏。我们利用进化游戏理论分析了参与者的行为如何随着奖赏机制的发展而演变。此外,还发现惩罚在维持封锁链的完整性方面起着核心作用。