Side-channel analysis attacks, especially horizontal DPA and DEMA attacks, are significant threats for cryptographic designs. In this paper we investigate to which extend different multiplication formulae and randomization of the field multiplier increase the resistance of an ECC design against horizontal attacks. We implemented a randomized sequence of the calculation of partial products for the field multiplication in order to increase the security features of the field multiplier. Additionally, we use the partial polynomial multiplier itself as a kind of countermeasure against DPA attacks. We demonstrate that the implemented classical multiplication formula can increase the inherent resistance of the whole ECC design. We also investigate the impact of the combination of these two approaches. For the evaluation we synthesized all these designs for a 250 nm gate library technologies, and analysed the simulated power traces. All investigated protection means help to decrease the success rate of attacks significantly: the correctness of the revealed key was decreased from 99% to 69%.
翻译:侧通道分析攻击,特别是横向政治部和DEMA攻击,是加密设计的重大威胁。在本文中,我们调查的是扩大不同倍数公式和外地乘数随机化使ECC设计对横向攻击的抗力增加。我们对场部分产品进行了随机计算,以增加外地乘数的安全特征。此外,我们使用部分多元乘数本身作为对抗政治部攻击的一种反措施。我们证明,执行的经典乘数公式可以增加整个ECC设计固有的抵抗力。我们还调查这两种方法的结合的影响。关于评价,我们综合了250纳米门图书馆技术的所有设计,并分析了模拟电源痕迹。所有调查的保护都有助于显著降低攻击的成功率:所显示的钥匙的正确性从99%下降到69%。