Two long-lived players play a dynamic game of competitive persuasion. Each period, each provides information to a single short-lived receiver. When the players also set prices, we unearth a folk theorem: if they are sufficiently patient, virtually any vector of feasible and individually rational payoffs can be sustained in a subgame perfect equilibrium. Without price-setting, there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium. In it, patient players provide less information--maximally patient ones none.
翻译:两个长寿的玩家玩一个充满活力的竞争说服游戏。每个时期,每个时期,每个时期都向一个短寿的接收者提供信息。当玩家也设定价格时,我们发现一个民俗的理论:如果他们有足够的耐心,几乎任何可行和个体合理报酬的载体都可以在一个子游戏的完美平衡中持续。没有定价,就有一个独特的子游戏的完美平衡。在这个时期,耐心的玩家提供的信息更少 — — 最大的耐心。