Recent studies have shown that Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to the backdoor attacks, which leads to malicious behaviors of DNNs when specific triggers are attached to the input images. It was further demonstrated that the infected DNNs possess a collection of channels, which are more sensitive to the backdoor triggers compared with normal channels. Pruning these channels was then shown to be effective in mitigating the backdoor behaviors. To locate those channels, it is natural to consider their Lipschitzness, which measures their sensitivity against worst-case perturbations on the inputs. In this work, we introduce a novel concept called Channel Lipschitz Constant (CLC), which is defined as the Lipschitz constant of the mapping from the input images to the output of each channel. Then we provide empirical evidences to show the strong correlation between an Upper bound of the CLC (UCLC) and the trigger-activated change on the channel activation. Since UCLC can be directly calculated from the weight matrices, we can detect the potential backdoor channels in a data-free manner, and do simple pruning on the infected DNN to repair the model. The proposed Channel Lipschitzness based Pruning (CLP) method is super fast, simple, data-free and robust to the choice of the pruning threshold. Extensive experiments are conducted to evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of CLP, which achieves state-of-the-art results among the mainstream defense methods even without any data. Source codes are available at https://github.com/rkteddy/channel-Lipschitzness-based-pruning.
翻译:最近的研究显示,深神经网络(DNNS)很容易受到后门攻击,在输入图像附着特定触发器时,DNNS的恶意行为导致DNS的恶意行为;还表明,受感染的DNNS拥有一系列频道,这些频道与正常频道相比,对后门触发器更为敏感;然后,这些频道在减轻后门行为方面被证明是有效的;要找到这些频道,自然可以考虑它们的Lipschitzness,用来测量它们对于输入输入输入中最坏情况干扰的敏感度。在这项工作中,我们引入了一个新概念,称为Chanel Lipschitz Constant(CLC),它的定义是:从输入图像图像到每个频道输出输出的Lipschitz的绘图常数常数;然后,我们提供经验证据,表明CLCM(ULCS)上界与启动的触发器变化之间的密切关联性。由于UCLCF可以直接从重量矩阵中计算出,我们可以以无数据方式探测潜在的后门通道,在受感染者中间进行简单的评估,而无需在受感染的Prun-CLPNPRS-CS-CRS-CS-Servereal的快速检索数据模型进行。