This paper proposes a novel approach to resilient distributed optimization with quadratic costs in a networked control system (e.g., wireless sensor network, power grid, robotic team) prone to external attacks (e.g., hacking, power outage) that cause agents to misbehave. Departing from classical filtering strategies proposed in literature, we draw inspiration from a game-theoretic formulation of the consensus problem and argue that adding competition to the mix can enhance resilience in the presence of malicious agents. Our intuition is corroborated by analytical and numerical results showing that i) our strategy highlights the presence of a nontrivial tradeoff between blind collaboration and full competition, and ii) such competition-based approach can outperform state-of-the-art algorithms based on Mean Subsequence Reduced.
翻译:本文提出了一种新颖的办法来以网络控制系统(如无线传感器网络、电网、机器人团队等)中的二次成本进行有弹性的分配优化,这种优化容易引起外部攻击(如黑客、断电),导致代理行为不端。 我们脱离文献中提议的经典过滤战略,从对共识问题的游戏理论提法中汲取灵感,认为在混合中增加竞争可以增强恶意代理的抗御能力。我们的直觉得到分析和数字结果的证实,表明一)我们的战略强调盲目合作与全面竞争之间存在非两端的权衡,二)这种以竞争为基础的方法可以超越基于 " 平等子序列减少 " 的先进算法。