With the onset of COVID-19, governments worldwide planned to develop and deploy contact tracing (CT) apps to help speed up the contact tracing process. However, experts raised concerns about the long-term privacy and security implications of using these apps. Consequently, several proposals were made to design privacy-preserving CT apps. To this end, Google and Apple developed the Google/Apple Exposure Notification (GAEN) framework to help public health authorities develop privacy-preserving CT apps. In the United States, 26 states used the GAEN framework to develop their CT apps. In this paper, we empirically evaluate the US-based GAEN apps to determine 1) the privileges they have, 2) if the apps comply with their defined privacy policies, and 3) if they contain known vulnerabilities that can be exploited to compromise privacy. The results show that all apps violate their stated privacy policy and contain several known vulnerabilities.
翻译:随着COVID-19的启动,全世界各国政府计划开发和部署联系追踪(CT)应用程序,以帮助加快联系追踪进程,然而,专家们对使用这些应用程序的长期隐私和安全影响表示关切,因此,提出了几项建议,设计保护隐私的CT应用程序,为此,谷歌和苹果开发了Google/Apple 曝光通知框架,以帮助公共卫生当局开发保护隐私的CT应用程序。在美国,26个州利用GAEN框架开发了自己的CT应用程序。在本文件中,我们实证地评估了以美国为基地的GAEN应用程序,以确定:(1) 如果这些应用程序符合其界定的隐私政策,(2) 如果这些应用程序包含已知的脆弱性,可以被用来损害隐私。结果显示,所有应用程序都违反了其公开的隐私政策,并包含一些已知的脆弱性。