Peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading is a promising market scheme to accommodate the increasing distributed energy resources (DERs). However, how P2P to be integrated into the existing power systems remains to be investigated. In this paper, we apply network charge as a means for the grid operator to attribute transmission loss and ensure network constraints for empowering P2P transaction. The interaction between the grid operator and the prosumers is modeled as a Stackelberg game, which yields a bi-level optimization problem. We prove that the Stackelberg game admits an equilibrium network charge price. Besides, we propose a method to obtain the network charge price by converting the bi-level optimization into a single-level mixed-integer quadratic programming (MIQP), which can handle a reasonable scale of prosumers efficiently. Simulations on the IEEE bus systems show that the proposed optimal network charge is favorable as it can benefit both the grid operator and the prosumers for empowering the P2P market, and achieves near-optimal social welfare. Moreover, the results show that the presence of energy storage will make the prosumers more sensitive to the network charge price changes.
翻译:P2P 能源交易是一个充满希望的市场计划,可以容纳不断扩大的分散能源资源(DERs),然而,如何将P2P纳入现有电力系统仍有待调查。在本文中,我们应用网络收费作为网格操作员计算传输损失和确保增强P2P交易的网络限制的手段。网格操作员和计票机之间的互动模式是Stackelberg游戏,这会产生双级优化问题。我们证明Stackelberg游戏承认平衡网络收费价格。此外,我们提出一种方法,通过将双级优化转换为单级混合电动二次方程式(MIQP)来获得网络收费价格,这种程序可以有效处理合理规模的分期付款机。IEEE公交系统模拟显示,拟议的最佳网络收费是有利的,因为它既有利于电网操作员,又有利于增强P2P市场,也有利于实现接近最佳的社会福利。此外,结果显示,能源储存的存在将使预购商更敏感地改变网络价格。