Anti-malware agents typically communicate with their remote services to share information about suspicious files. These remote services use their up-to-date information and global context (view) to help classify the files and instruct their agents to take a predetermined action (e.g., delete or quarantine). In this study, we provide a security analysis of a specific form of communication between anti-malware agents and their services, which takes place entirely over the insecure DNS protocol. These services, which we denote DNS anti-malware list (DNSAML) services, affect the classification of files scanned by anti-malware agents, therefore potentially putting their consumers at risk due to known integrity and confidentiality flaws of the DNS protocol. By analyzing a large-scale DNS traffic dataset made available to the authors by a well-known CDN provider, we identify anti-malware solutions that seem to make use of DNSAML services. We found that these solutions, deployed on almost three million machines worldwide, exchange hundreds of millions of DNS requests daily. These requests are carrying sensitive file scan information, oftentimes - as we demonstrate - without any additional safeguards to compensate for the insecurities of the DNS protocol. As a result, these anti-malware solutions that use DNSAML are made vulnerable to DNS attacks. For instance, an attacker capable of tampering with DNS queries, gains the ability to alter the classification of scanned files, without presence on the scanning machine. We showcase three attacks applicable to at least three anti-malware solutions that could result in the disclosure of sensitive information and improper behavior of the anti-malware agent, such as ignoring detected threats. Finally, we propose and review a set of countermeasures for anti-malware solution providers to prevent the attacks stemming from the use of DNSAML services.
翻译:这些远程服务使用最新信息和全球背景(视图)来帮助对文件进行分类,并指示其代理采取预先确定的行动(例如删除或隔离)。在本研究中,我们提供了对反软件代理及其服务之间某种特定形式的通信的安全分析,这种通信形式完全在不安全的DNS协议中进行。这些服务我们用DNS抗软件列表(DNS-软件)服务,影响反软件代理扫描文件的分类,因此可能由于DNS协议已知的诚信和保密缺陷而使其消费者面临风险。通过分析一个众所周知的CDN提供者向作者提供的大规模DNS交通数据集,我们找出似乎使用DNSAM服务的反软件解决方案。我们发现,这些解决方案安装在近300万台DNS软件服务器上,每天交换数亿个DNS服务供应商的要求。这些请求含有敏感的文件扫描信息,常常因为我们没有显示任何可应用的DNS协议的不真实性的行为。