Proof-of-Work (PoW) is a Sybil control mechanism adopted in blockchain-based cryptocurrencies. It prevents the attempt of malicious actors to manipulate distributed ledgers. Bitcoin has successfully suppressed double-spending by accepting the longest PoW chain. Nevertheless, PoW encountered several major security issues surrounding mining competition. One of them is a Block WithHolding (BWH) attack that can exploit a widespread and cooperative environment called a mining pool. This attack takes advantage of untrustworthy relationships between mining pools and participating agents. Moreover, detecting or responding to attacks is challenging due to the nature of mining pools. In this paper, however, we suggest that BWH attacks also have a comparable trust problem. Because a BWH attacker cannot have complete control over BWH agents, they can betray the belonging mining pool and seek further benefits by trading with victims. We prove that this betrayal is not only valid in all attack parameters but also provides double benefits; finally, it is the best strategy for BWH agents. Furthermore, our study implies that BWH attacks may encounter self-destruction of their own revenue, contrary to their intention.
翻译:工作验证(PoW)是环链加密中采用的Sybil控制机制,它防止恶意行为者操纵分布式分类账的企图。Bitcoin通过接受最长的PoW链成功地抑制了双重支出。然而,PoW遇到了与采矿竞争有关的几个重大安全问题。其中之一是 " 与矿场隔绝 " (BWH)袭击,它可以利用一个广泛的合作环境,称为采矿池。这次袭击利用了采矿池和参与剂之间不可信的关系。此外,发现或应对袭击由于采矿池的性质而具有挑战性。然而,我们在本文件中认为,BWH袭击也存在类似的信任问题。由于BWHT袭击者无法完全控制BWH代理,他们可以背叛属于其所有的采矿池,并通过与受害者交易寻求进一步的利益。我们证明,这种背叛不仅在所有攻击参数上都有效,而且提供了双重好处;最后,这是BWHT的最佳策略。此外,我们的研究还暗示,BWHE攻击可能违背其意图,使自己的收入遭到自毁。