In this letter, a resilient path planning scheme is proposed to navigate a UAV to the planned (nominal) destination with minimum energy-consumption in the presence of a smart attacker. The UAV is equipped with two sensors, a GPS sensor, which is vulnerable to the spoofing attacker, and a well-functioning Ultra-Wideband (UWB) sensor, which is possible to be fooled. We show that a covert attacker can significantly deviate the UAV's path by simultaneously corrupting the GPS signals and forging control inputs without being detected by the UWB sensor. The prerequisite for the attack occurrence is first discussed. Based on this prerequisite, the optimal attack scheme is proposed, which maximizes the deviation between the nominal destination and the real one. Correspondingly, an energy-efficient and resilient navigation scheme based on Pontryagin's maximum principle \cite{gelfand2000calculus} is formulated, which depresses the above covert attacker effectively. To sum up, this problem can be seen as a Stackelberg game \cite{bacsar1998dynamic} between a secure path planner (defender) and a covert attacker. The effectiveness and practicality of our theoretical results are illustrated via two series of simulation examples and a UAV experiment.
翻译:在此信中,提出了一个具有弹性的路径规划计划计划,在智能攻击者在场的情况下,将无人驾驶航空器驶向计划(名义)的(名义)目的地,在智能攻击者在场的情况下,尽量减少能量消耗。无人驾驶航空器配备了两个传感器,一个GP传感器,容易受潜伏攻击者攻击,另一个功能良好的超双翼(UWB)传感器,这有可能被骗。我们表明,隐蔽攻击者通过同时腐蚀全球定位系统信号和在未被UWB传感器发现的情况下截取控制输入,可以大大偏离无人驾驶飞行器的路径。首先讨论了袭击发生的先决条件。根据这一先决条件,提出了最佳攻击计划,使名义目标与实际目标之间的偏差最大化。相应的是,根据Pontryagin的最高原则(cite{gelfand2000caculus)制定了一个节能和弹性导航计划,该原则有效抑制了上述隐蔽攻击者。总而言,这个问题可以被视为一个Stackelberg游戏游戏,攻击发生的先决条件。根据这个前提,提出了最佳攻击计划,将名义目标与实际飞行结果显示两个路径。