In a standard Turing test, a machine has to prove its humanness to the judges. By successfully imitating a thinking entity such as a human, this machine then proves that it can also think. Some objections claim that Turing test is not a tool to demonstrate the existence of general intelligence or thinking activity. A compelling alternative is the Lovelace test, in which the agent must originate a product that the agent's creator cannot explain. Therefore, the agent must be the owner of an original product. However, for this to happen the agent must exhibit the idea of self and distinguish oneself from others. Sustaining the idea of self within the Turing test is still possible if the judge decides to act as a textual mirror. Self-recognition tests applied on animals through mirrors appear to be viable tools to demonstrate the existence of a type of general intelligence. Methodology here constructs a textual version of the mirror test by placing the agent as the one and only judge to figure out whether the contacted one is an other, a mimicker, or oneself in an unsupervised manner. This textual version of the mirror test is objective, self-contained, and devoid of humanness. Any agent passing this textual mirror test should have or can acquire a thought mechanism that can be referred to as the inner-voice, answering the original and long lasting question of Turing "Can machines think?" in a constructive manner still within the bounds of the Turing test. Moreover, it is possible that a successful self-recognition might pave way to stronger notions of self-awareness in artificial beings.
翻译:在标准图灵测试中,机器必须向法官证明它的人性。通过成功地模仿像人类这样的思考实体,机器然后证明它也可以思考。一些反对者声称图灵测试不是证明存在一般智能或思维活动的工具。一个令人信服的替代办法是爱心测试,在这种测试中,代理人必须产生代理人的创作者无法解释的产品。因此,代理人必须是原始产品的拥有者。然而,要做到这一点,代理人必须展示自我意识,自我与他人区别。如果法官决定以文字镜的形式行事,在图灵测试中维持自我意识仍然是可能的。一些反对者称,图灵测试不是用来证明存在一般智能或思维活动的工具。一个令人信服的选项是爱心测试,其中代理者必须提出原始产品的原始产品,只有判断与他人接触者是否为另一个人、模拟者或自我与他人不同的方式。这个镜像测试的文本版本是客观的、自我固固的、自我认知的、自我认知的自我认知的自我测试是可行的工具。 任何代理者都能够通过原始的测试方式,而能够将原始的原始的自我测试变成一个具有建设性的测试的深层次。