When assessing a software-based system, the results of Bayesian statistical inference on operational testing data can provide strong support for software reliability claims. For inference, this data (i.e. software successes and failures) is often assumed to arise in an independent, identically distributed (i.i.d.) manner. In this paper we show how conservative Bayesian approaches make this assumption unnecessary, by incorporating one's doubts about the assumption into the assessment. We derive conservative confidence bounds on a system's probability of failure on demand (pfd), when operational testing reveals no failures. The generality and utility of the confidence bounds are illustrated in the assessment of a nuclear power-plant safety-protection system, under varying levels of skepticism about the i.i.d. assumption. The analysis suggests that the i.i.d. assumption can make Bayesian reliability assessments extremely optimistic - such assessments do not explicitly account for how software can be very likely to exhibit no failures during extensive operational testing despite the software's pfd being undesirably large.
翻译:在评估基于软件的系统时,Bayesian对操作测试数据的统计推断结果可以为软件可靠性索赔提供有力的支持。据推断,这种数据(即软件成功和失败)往往被假定为独立、分布相同(即d)的方式产生。在本文中,我们通过将人们对假设的怀疑纳入评估,表明保守的Bayesian方法如何使这一假设变得没有必要。当操作测试显示没有失败时,我们从系统按要求(pfd)的失灵概率(pfd)中得出保守的信任界限。在对核电厂安全保护系统的评估中说明了信任界限的普遍性和效用,在对i.d.假设的不同程度的怀疑下。分析表明,i.d.d.假设可以使Bayesian可靠性评估极为乐观――这种评估没有明确说明软件在广泛的操作测试中如何很有可能显示没有失败,尽管软件规模不大。